By January 1943, Hidayat’s family was well installed in Dieulefit. He was teaching music at the Lycée Musical, giving meditation classes at the Beauvallon’s school run by Marguerite Soubeyran and working in a pottery factory. He had to do manual labor but soon was transferred as an office staff as his capabilities were soon acknowledged to make a greater contribution there.

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In that month, Jean Moulin in an attempt to unify the French resistance, consolidated Combat, Liberation-Sud and the Franc-Tireurs and Partisans under the co-ordination of the Resistance United Movement (Mouvement Unis de la Resistance). In Dieulefit, Marguerite Soubeyran organized the armed resistance against the German with men escaping obligatory work in Germany “Service du travail obligatoire.” Jeanne Barnier, mayor’s secretary provided false identifications. It was on February 16, 1943 that conscription for labor in Germany (STO) was introduced. This directive sent many men in hiding, including in the Vercors and around Dieulefit.

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By that time in February 1943, the German Army had taken tremendous losses; the German troops at Stalingrad had been forced to surrender.

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In May 12, 1943, between Comps and Dieulefit, BCRAA WT Roger Labrid, aka Richard, aka Lasalle and WT Andre Angel, aka Bernard were infiltrated with an RAF 624 plane. Lieutenant Roger Labrid, aka Richard as referred by Captain Raynaud as Lieutenant Richard was responsible for SAP Drome south. Andre Angel will be arrested in Dieulefit on December 2, 1944, and deported. (103)

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Lieutenant Raynaud as he will only become Captain early 1944 was parachuted June 18, 1943, at Chaumont-sur-Loire, DZ Les Motteux. Raynaud aka Alain, aka Linkman, pseudo Pierre ogapoff was sent to be sabotage instructor for the Jockey network under Major Francis Cammaert, aka Roger who was in France since March 1943. (104)

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Hidayat contributed not only to passive resistance, very much in spirit with his own spiritual ideal and in communion with the local people, but he also engaged himself in supporting the armed resistance from that time in 1943.

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He spoke about helping receiving airdrops around Dieulefit and been surrounded by the German troops, hiding in the mountain and starving, he stole a German horse to exchange it against a farm chicken. That story always made me smile as the unequal exchange was great since a horse could have fed many more people than a chicken. That story must have happened later when surrounded by the German troops on the Vercors after D day, June 6, 1944.

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His sister Noor Inayat Khan (105) was training in London with the SOE, under Colonel Buckmaster, getting ready to be flown to France on June 16, 1943, under the cryptonym “Madeleine” with the cover identity of Jeanne-Marie Regnier. The same SOE that was also involved in Dieulefit with the Jockey Circuit under Major Cammaerts who reported to Colonel Buckmaster.

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As indicated above, Lieutenant Pierre Raynaud (Alain) arrived at Chamont sur Loire on June 18, 1943, and was received by the local resistance committee. Raynaud became captain on June 6, 1944, and was promoted chief of an FFI battalion. In 1943, he was 22 years old. His duties were to assist Major Cammaerts “Roger” who reported to Colonel Buckmaster in London. Buckmaster directed Churchill secret army called SOE. Cammaerts oversaw the Jockey network active in the south of France including the Drôme department.

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June 22, 1943, Raynaud contacted Cammaerts and Daujat who was Montelimar resistance leader, thirty miles west of Dieulefit.

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In the afternoon of June 23, the day after his arrival, the house occupied by Cecile Lefort and Pierre Raynaud were searched by the Italian police without consequences. Cecile Lefort had arrived from London with Hidayat’s sister, Noor Inayat Khan on June 17, 1943. (106)

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At the end of June 1943, thanks to Louis Daujat’s support and to Roger Poyol, a safe house was established by Albert Mielle at La Paillette near Dieulefit. Albert Mielle was always away as a sheep shepherd that was a perfect cover for his resistance activities as his wife ran the farm. Albert Mielle was one of the resistance activities leaders around Dieulefit with Jean Jouve, the ex-mayor and Henri Boucher.

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Raynaud found the population very sympathetic towards his organization. He cited in his report a dropping operation when the containers were very widely scattered, and it was impossible for him to retrieve them all. Yet within the next day, the missing containers were handed over to one of the group leaders by someone quite outside the organization. The town was very isolated, there was very little traffic passing through, and no Germans in the vicinity. La Paillette was in a very useful position since Raynaud had direct access to the mountains.

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Raynaud also stayed in Bourdeaux and Crest. Once the French militia came to the house where he was. Two men were waiting for him and were holding him with his hands up in the air. However, he was able to close the door on them and threw a grenade after jumping through the window. This forced him to stay in the Maquis for some time.

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Raynaud did not know the region well and had to survey it on a bicycle.

June 21, 1943, the Gestapo captured Jean Moulin and several resistant leaders who were meeting at Caluire, near Lyon.

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In July 1943, Raynaud left « La Paillette” for Andre Viel at “Menée en Diois”. Viel was a ranger working as a forestry guard. This location became the center around which the resistance activities for half of the Drome department spread.

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Until July 31 the Italians oversaw this French region close to the Italian border. From July 31, 1943, until August 10, the German relieved the Italian occupation forces in the south of France. On September 3, 1943, the Western Allies invaded the Italian mainland. On September 8, 1943, the German troops moved into the Italian occupation zone after Italy signed an Armistice with the Allies.

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As of September 1943, Dieulefit benefited from a benign Italian occupation force. There is a story of Italian trucks that were sabotaged in Dieulefit and the Italian army did not engage in any reprisals as German troops or Gestapo would do. Lucien Pontonnier, road and bridge engineer for Dieulefit, Bourdeaux et Marsanne county had hidden 42 trucks for the resistance and was denounced to the Gestapo April 27, 1943. The Gestapo found 15 trucks and transferred responsibility for this issue to the Italian army who oversaw this area and they brought the truck back to Dieulefit. Placed along the Marronniers alleyway waiting to be sent back to Montelimar, people charged to guard the truck sabotaged them. They put sand in the gas tank on the night of June 12, 1943. This first act of sabotage and resistance had great resonance in Dieulefit. (107)

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Jean Jouve, played a critical role in starting to organize the resistance. He started meeting in 1942 with the priest Georges Magnet and the pastor Debu-Bridel at Giraud’s home in Poët-Laval. Giraud was the ex-mayor of that village. Marguerite Soubeyran created the first maquis of Montmirail, behind her school, with young men hiding from being sent to forced labor in Germany. (108)

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Jean Jouve initiated the first contact with Alger and Emile Pugnon was the first officer preparing airdrop and parachuting soldiers around Dieulefit. He also got in contact with London with officers from the “Deuxième Bureau” who worked under Colonel Buckmaster in the SOE and for that region under Captain Francis Cammaerts and Lieutenant Pierre Raynaud.

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After Cecile Lefort’s arrest in September 1943, Cammaerts sent Raynaud to Chazelles. He was charged with organizing resistance groups and preparing airdrop sites.

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On October 13, 1943, Noor Inayat-Khan was arrested and interrogated at the Gestapo SD Headquarters at 84 Avenue Foch in Paris.

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This was particularly significant for Hidayat and his family in Dieulefit. These two young women, Cecile Lefort and Noor Inayat-Khan came in the same Lysander plane in June 1943. It is well documented that Noor did not speak under torture. Her tormenter and torturer commented on her spirit and bravery after the war saying that nothing relevant was extracted from Noor. Cecile Lefort knew as well that Noor’s brother was in Dieulefit as she worked closely with Captain Cammaerts and Raynaud as a courier. It would not have been impossible that Cecile brought a letter from Noor to Hidayat when she arrived (Waiting for Noor’s letters to Hidayat from the Imperial War Museum in London). The Gestapo would have liked to find Hidayat, at a minimum to use him to pressure his sister to cooperate. (still searching in the Gestapo’s archive to find Hidayat’s file). Either Noor or Cecile could have put Hidayat’s relative safety in dire jeopardy. However, both did not reveal anything about Hidayat in Dieulefit. Hidayat must have found out about this after the war and must have felt deeply indebted to both women. This was another factor motivating his self-effacement and relentless concentration to have his sister duly recognize for her contribution to the resistance effort against the Nazis and to free France from German occupation.

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There is much controversy about Henri Dericourt (109), a double agent who received Noor and Cecile in France. Dr. Goetz, a wireless expert in the Gestapo, revealed during his interrogation November 4, 1944, that he watched Noor arrive in France (110). Dericourt was passing all the SOE information to the Gestapo. The Gestapo knew from day one about Noor and Cecile. The Prosper network crumbled as Noor arrived in Paris. She stayed for her own demise. For Buckmaster and Bodington’s defense (111), they asked Noor to come back to London and she refused.

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Four hundred SOE agents in the Prosper network were sacrificed, including Noor to make Hitler and the German believe that the allied forces were preparing to land around Calais in a 1943 operation called Starkey (112). This was a huge deception as the real landing was really planned to be in Salerno, Operation Avalanche, on September 9, 1943 (113). 

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The British intelligence service mounted huge deceptive operations like Operation Mincemeat (invasion of Greece) to hide the true intention for Operation Husky, July 9, 1943 landing in Sicily. There was also another deception called Operation Boardman (invasion of the Balkans) to hide Operation Avalanche, September 9, 1943 landing on Salerno, Italy. Operation Starkey included sending 355 boats (all empty) towards the French coast on September 9, 1943, coinciding with the real landing in Salerno that same day. Prosper network had been instructed to prepare for the Calais landing and to do sabotages in order to make that deception believable. Prosper leaders were not told of the real intention and were themselves deceived.   

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During Dericourt (114) trial after the war, Buckmaster and Nicholas Bodington (SOE second in command) defended him saying that Dericourt was ordered to cooperate with the Gestapo. Dericourt neighbor in Paris 16 was Hugo Ernst Bleicher, a non-commissioned officer with the German Abwehr, and Dericourt shared all the SOE mail and information with him. The English conducted this huge deception at a heavy price for Prosper and its 400 agents (115).

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After the war, Captain Pierre Raynaud voiced strong concern about how the SOE handled its Jockey network and explained how he survived simply by relying on its own resources, protecting the information about his whereabouts even from his handlers (116).

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